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Abstract. Schengen Routing was proposed as a countermeasure to traf-
fic monitoring activities practiced by intelligence agencies. This work here
presents the results of a larger-scale measurement performed to quantify
Schengen Routing compliance in today’s Internet. Based on 3388 TCP,
UDP, and ICMP traceroute measurements executed from RIPE Atlas
probes located in over 1100 different Autonomous Systems (AS) in the
Schengen Area, it was found that 34.5% to 39.7% of these routes are
Schengen-compliant, while compliance levels vary from 0% to 80% among
countries. Finally, an approach was developed that allows end-users to
determine whether a specific route to a host is Schengen-compliant or
not.
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1 Introduction
The affair involving Edward Snowden and the National Security Agency (NSA)
in 2013 demonstrated that wiretapping large amounts of Internet traffic data
was not only possible, but also applied on a regular basis by various intelligence
agencies in violation of privacy laws [13]. However, the controversy only came
into broader political debate by the time it was alleged that several European
state heads had become victims of the wiretapping activities themselves [2].
In the context of the political and technical debate that followed, the idea
of Schengen Routing demonstrated to be a possible amendment to protect com-
munications across Europe. The term Schengen refers to the treaty targeted at
reducing border controls and implementing a harmonized legal framework [9].
Those countries, who signed the Schengen Treaty, form the Schengen Area. Ta-
ble 1 shows the current Schengen members. It is important to highlight that
the Schengen Area is not equivalent to the European Union (EU), since some
countries belonging to the EU are not part of Schengen (e.g., United Kingdom),
while Schengen also comprises non-EU countries (e.g., Switzerland).
Schengen Routing refers to the practice of routing Internet traffic between
hosts located in the Schengen Area, not leaving the borders of countries part
of the Schengen Treaty. Such Internet traffic not leaving the Schengen Area
is more difficult to be wiretapped by non-Schengen intelligence agencies, since
Table 1. Schengen members as of January 2015
Country Code Country Name Country Code Country Name
AT Austria IT Italy
BE Belgium LI Liechtenstein
CH Switzerland LT Lithuania
CZ Czech Republic LU Luxemburg
DE Germany LV Latvia
DK Denmark MT Malta
EE Estonia NL Netherlands
ES Spain NO Norway
FI Finland PL Poland
FR France PT Portugal
GR Greece SE Sweden
HU Hungary SI Slovenia
IS Island SK Slovakia
the Internet traffic remains still unencrypted. However, this traffic remains still
vulnerable to wiretapping activities that may occur within Schengen [16].
An implementation of Schengen routing requires the reconfiguration of rout-
ing tables and the renegotiation of transit and peering agreements. The effort
required depends significantly on the degree to which current routing already
complies with Schengen routing or not. However, there is no previous work avail-
able, which measured a Schengen routing compliance through active measure-
ments by analyzing TCP, ICMP, and UDP traffic. Thus, this paper answers the
following question: What is the Schengen routing compliance or non-compliance
percentage of current traffic among Schengen countries based on the observation
of active measurements?
For that a large number of traceroute measurements was executed by ap-
plying RIPE Atlas [17] probes located in Autonomous Systems (AS) within
Schengen to a well-known host in Switzerland, being part of the Schengen Area.
ASes were chosen as the unit of analysis, because ASes are collections of network
devices managed by a single administrative authority that can decide to coop-
erate with government agencies or not. IP addresses of nodes along a network
path can be determined by using the traceroute tool. By means of a database,
such as GeoLite [10], IP addresses obtained can be related to ASes and coun-
tries and, thus, placed in- or outside Schengen. Next to these measurements, a
tool termed chkroute has been developed, allowing end-users to find out whether
specific routes are Schengen-compliant.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work. The
approach applied and evaluations performed are described in Sections 3 and 4,
respectively. Section 5 presents the chkroute tool developed. Finally, Section 6
summarizes the work, draws conclusions, and outlines future steps.
2 Related Work
The most detailed work analyzing routes leaving the Schengen Area was per-
formed by [16]. Publically accessible BGP routing tables were obtained and,
based on BGP routing entries, a graph of ASes was generated. Based on these
graphs, traffic routes were established and analyzed to assess whether traffic be-
tween two peers within the Schengen Area would leave the area, thus, pointing
on non-compliant Schengen Area routes. It was assumed that an AS belongs
to a particular country, if the majority of its allocated Internet Protocol (IP)
address space is bound to that country. Therefore, if an AS hosts IP addresses
used in countries X, Y, and Z, but more than 50% is allocated to country X,
the AS is considered to be located in country X. Such an assumption simplifies
the full process of binding ASes to particular countries. However, it may present
non-realistic results, since some ASes can present logical connections to several
countries that not necessarily reflect the true country of origin of such an AS [19].
Those results show that, e.g., in Belgium, Switzerland, and Spain, more than one
third of available routes are operating via ASes located outside the respective
country. It is further found that the number of routes leaving the Schengen Area
substantially varies among countries, e.g., 0% in Iceland and 35.38% in Belgium.
Another approach analyzed the content of BGP routing tables [12]. The
respective outcomes are beneficial due to 3 reasons:
1. BGP looking glasses are servers running specific software designed to retrieve
routing information. These servers are found in a considerable number of
strategic ASes around the globe.
2. Evaluating BGP routing tables is a passive and, thus, less intrusive approach
to form an AS graph.
3. BGP routing tables present a wider view of routing possibilities within each
AS.
The major disadvantage of this approach is the lack of certainty that a packet
will follow the inferred AS graph to a specific destination as the information may
be incomplete or out of date.
Therefore, active measurements involving tools such as, e.g., traceroute, are
employed to discover Internet routes that are being used in practice for particular
protocols and traffic [3]. Moreover, traceroute measurements are able to (1) reveal
multiple routers within an AS and not only an AS-level graph representation,
and (2) provide a real time result of the current network hops from source to
destination. Thus, Paris traceroute [1] provides a more realistic routing map
compared to the classic traceroute tool, solving problems caused by the current
vast deployment of load balancers in the Internet. Paris traceroute addresses
per-flow load balancers, varying header fields, such as the TCP/ICMP sequence
number, the UDP checksum, and the ICMP identifier. The chkroute tool uses
Paris traceroute to collect routing information (i.e., IP addresses of network
hops) from the source to the destination, and uses the GeoLite database [10]
to map IP address ranges to ASes. Table 2 summarizes major characteristics of
chkroute and [16] to analyze Schengen Routing compliance.
Table 2. Characteristics comparison of approaches analyzing Schengen Routing com-
pliance
Approaches
Characteristics
Based on
Active Mea-
surements
Based on
Passive Mea-
surements
Uses
GeoLite
Database
Provide
Compliance
in Real Time
[16] no yes yes no
chkroute no yes yes yes
A major disadvantage of Schengen routing is that Internet traffic remains
unencrypted. As a consequence, it is still vulnerable to wiretapping activities
from within Schengen. A wide-spread use of end-to-end encryption would resolve
this issue [16].
3 Approach
To measure Schengen routing compliance, a larger-scale measurement has been
performed. RIPE Atlas [17] was chosen as a measurement platform due to its
high AS coverage. ASes were selected for anlysis, because they appear as units
controlled by a single administrative entity defining routing policies that has the
capability to coopreate with intelligence agencies or not.
3.1 Test-bed Selection
To perform real-life measurements at a larger scale, a suitable test-bed is needed.
Test-beds had to meet two requirements to be taken into consideration:
1. The test-bed had to be able to run traceroute measurements to retrieve IP
addresses of nodes along a routing path.
2. The test-bed had to provide a high AS coverage in the Schengen Area.
Several test-beds could have been used to perform larger-scale measurements:
Planet-Lab [15], EMANICSLab [8], Bismark [18], and RIPE Atlas [17].
On one hand, Planet-Lab [15] and EMANICSLab [8] provide administrative
access to the machines and, therefore, allow for full control over all aspects of
the experiment. On the other hand, the number of ASes currently covered by
these test-beds in Europe is lower when compared to RIPE Atlas: EMANICSLab
provide nodes in 11 different ASes, while Planet-Lab provides nodes in 69 ASes.
In contrast, RIPE Atlas provides 1306 ASes in the Schengen Area alone. Since
Planet-Lab and EMANICSLab nodes are predominantly located in academic and
research networks, such a distribution may not necessarily be representative for
assessing Schengen routing compliance in the Schengen Internet as a whole [7].
The project Bismark [18] allows researchers to perform measurements from
home routers equipped with a modified openWRT firmware [14]. The project
cannot be used to study Schengen compliance, since there are only 178 routers
globally available, and even less within Schengen as of 2014 [18].
RIPE Atlas is a measurement infrastructure initiated and coordinated by
RIPE NCC [17]. According to RIPE’s website, “RIPE NCC is building the
largest measurement infrastructure ever made” [17]. The RIPE Atlas measure-
ment infrastructure is based on a large number of low-cost measurement nodes
given away for free to volunteers willing to host those probes in their private,
institutional, or public networks. In exchange for hosting a probe, volunteers
get access to measurement statistics and obtain credits that can be traded for
running user-defined measurements on the infrastructure. The RIPE Atlas mea-
surement infrastructure provides the best AS coverage by a substantial margin
(1306 different ASes in Schengen alone) and was, therefore, chosen for the Schen-
gen routing compliance analysis.
3.2 AS Selection
To determine to what extent traffic complies with Schengen Routing, a list of
ASes in the Schengen Area had to be selected. Maxmind provides a free geo-
location database named GeoLite [10], which maps IP address ranges to ASes
and countries. The respective information is provided in two separate files. The
first file contains IP address ranges in a long representation along with an AS
number (e.g., 5 10 AS1). The second file contains IP address ranges in a long
representation along with a country code (e.g., 5 10 CH). Based on this informa-
tion, the number of IP addresses per AS and country was calculated (e.g., AS1
has 10 - 5 + 1 = 6 IP addresses in CH (Switzerland)). These AS and country
ranges did not always match and had to be divided into matching subranges in
these cases. The logic for calculating the number of IP addresses per country
remained the same. ASes were included in the measurement effort, if they had
at least one IP address in a Schengen country. The resulting number of ASes in
the Schengen Area was 9967 (cf. Table 3).
Table 3. Number of ASes after results processing (T: TCP, U: UDP, I: ICMP)
Original Not No Probes Failed/Error Outside Schengen Remaining
Covered T U I T U I T U I T U I
9967 8661 44 47 50 25 24 25 105 104 106 1132 1131 1125
3.3 Measurement Execution
All traceroute measurements were executed using the RIPE Atlas measurement
infrastructure. RIPE Atlas allows to specify an AS number as a measurement
source and selects a suitable probe with an IP address within the AS auto-
matically. The target IP address of all traceroute measurements was a machine
located within Schengen at the premises of University of Zurich, Switzerland
(within AS 559). Measurement requests were submitted for all 9967 ASes deter-
mined in Section 3.2 for the ICMP, TCP, and UDP protocol in turn. For each
protocol, RIPE Atlas performed three traceroute measurements automatically.
These measurements were limited to one target host and three traceroute
measurements per protocol because the number of measurements that can be
performed on RIPE Atlas is limited by the credit earned by the respective vol-
unteer.
3.4 Results Processing
All results obtained from these measurements were processed in several steps
(see Table 3).
1. Measurement requests were submitted for 9967 ASes, out of which 8661 ASes
were not covered by RIPE Atlas. They could, therefore, not be taken into
consideration.
2. RIPE Atlas could not find suitable probing devices in all ASes covered. These
ASes could not be taken into consideration.
3. Some measurements failed or produced invalid results (e.g., error messages
rather than measurement data) and were excluded.
4. ASes may have IP address ranges advertised in several countries, especially in
ASes with large number of IP address subnets. Because RIPE Atlas chooses
IP addresses within the AS at its discrection, an IP address outside the
Schengen Area may be selected. Measurements executed from probes having
IP addresses located outside the Schengen Area were excluded.
After this results processing, 1132 TCP, 1131 UDP, and 1125 ICMP valid
measurements remained for an evaluation. The unprocessed traceroute files ob-
tained from RIPE Atlas measurements have been made publically available [5].
4 Evaluation
These results obtained were classified with respect to Schengen routing compli-
ance as follows:
1. Measurements containing at least one IP address located outside the Schen-
gen Area were classified as ”Non-compliant” (NC).
2. Measurements containing only IP addresses inside the Schengen Area were
classified as ”Compliant” (C).
3. Measurements containing IP addresses for which no country information
was available or for which traceroute did not produce an IP address were
classified as ”Unknown” (U), if all other IP addresses were located within
Schengen and ”Non-Compliant” otherwise
To determine the geographic location of an IP address, Maxmind’s GeoLite
database [10] was used, the same database as was used for the AS selection
process described in Section 3.2. Figure 1 provides an overview of those results
found. Light gray shades represent higher Schengen routing compliance levels
while dark gray shades stand for lower compliance levels.
Fig. 1. Schengen routing compliance levels
All detailed results are shown in Table 4. The “R” column ranks the Schen-
gen countries – represented by their ISO code – according to the relative amount
of compliant TCP routes. TCP was chosen for ranking, since it is the most fre-
quently used transport protocol in the Internet as of today. The “ASes” column
represents the number of ASes for which traceroute measurements have been per-
formed. “T” represents the total number of measurements that were performed
for the respective country and protocol. “C”, “NC”, and “U” show the amount
of routes that were compliant, non-compliant, and unknown, respectively. For
each of these categories the absolute and relative values are provided.
4.1 Results Analysis
This section discusses the results presented in Table 4, providing insight into
compliant, non-compliant, and unknown routes.
Table 4. Schengen Routing compliance analysis
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Overall compliance levels range from 34.5% in the TCP case, to 37.4% in
the UDP, and 39.7% in the ICMP case. The variation among countries is sub-
stantial, though, it ranges from 0% (TCP), 0% (UDP) and 0% (ICMP) in the
case of Malta (MT) to 80% (TCP), 75% (UDP), and 80% (ICMP) in the case of
Liechtenstein (LI). These results show that no country is fully compliant with
Schengen routing for those active measurement results.
Overall non-compliance levels range from 33.8% in the TCP case to 38.7%
in the UDP and 42.3% in the ICMP case. As it happens for the compliance
level, the variation among countries is considerable, it ranges from 0% (TCP)
and 20% (ICMP) in the case of Liechtenstein (LI) and 19.4% (UDP) in the case
of Switzerland (CH) to 81.8% (TCP), 81.8% (UDP), and 84.8% (ICMP) in the
case of Estonia (EE).
The relative amount of unknown routes ranges from 31.7% in the TCP case to
23.9% in the UDP and 17.9% in the ICMP case. The variation among countries is
less pronounced for unknown routes compared to compliant and non-compliant
routes, in the TCP case results range from 18.2% in Estonia (EE) to 50% in
Italy (IT), in the UDP case they range from 0% in Liechtenstein (LI) to 42.4%
in Italy (IT), and in the ICMP case results range from 0% in Liechtenstein (LI)
to 41.1% in Italy (IT).
The core finding is that compliance levels vary significantly among individual
countries and range from a very low to a very high compliance. As a consequence,
overall values are of limited use. The second finding is that there is no signifi-
cant variation among transport protocols with respect to the relative amount of
compliant, non-compliant, and unknown routes.
4.2 Comparative Analysis
While the work [16] used a passive approach based on publically available BGP
routing table information, countries were ranked according to a Schengen rout-
ing compliance score, which represents the relative amount of routes that do
not comply with Schengen routing [16]. Although the geo-location information
is taken from Maxmind’s GeoLite database [10] in both cases, the comparison
of both sets of results obtained are compared and shown in Table 5. The rel-
ative amount of non-compliant routes obtained using active measurements in
the chkroute approach exceeds in almost all cases the amount obtained using
the model based on BGP routing table data. An analysis discussing the reasons
resulting in those differences found between [16] and the chkroute approach is
omitted at this point, because the routing data used to produce results in [16]
is not available.
5 Design and Implementation of the chkroute Tool
While those results presented are useful to obtain a general understanding of
compliance levels in each of the individual Schengen countries, end-users are
more interested to learn whether specific routes are compliant with Schengen
Table 5. Non-compliant routes according to Pohlmann et al. [16] vs. chkroute
Country Code Country Pohlmann et al. [16] chkroute
BE Belgium 35.38% 49.4%
LI Liechtenstein 29.41% 0.0%
CH Switzerland 23.48% 15.2%
ES Spain 21.27% 43.4%
LU Luxembourg 21.15% 47.4%
FR France 19.13% 26.4%
MT Malta 17.86% 66.7%
FI Finland 16.58% 56.0%
CZ CzechRepublic 16.31% 31.3%
SE Sweden 14.92% 30.5%
NL Netherlands 13.07% 19.3%
DE Germany 12.26% 32.5%
NO Norway 10.31% 41.5%
GR Greece 8.67% 61.1%
EE Estonia 6.78% 81.8%
SK Slovakia 6.25% 33.3%
LT Lithuania 5.50% 36.4%
IT Italy 3.70% 31.4%
AT Austria 3.23% 25.0%
DK Denmark 1.75% 26.3%
PL Poland 1.43% 41.0%
PT Portugal 1.39% 66.7%
LV Latvia 1.34% 61.5%
SI Slovenia 1.15% 58.3%
HU Hungary 0.49% 38.3%
IS Iceland 0.00% 38.9%
Routing or not. Therefore, chkroute was designed and prototyped. The tool
chkroute assesses whether a specific route complies to Schengen Routing or not
and is available at [6].
The tool’s architecture consists out of the 3 components depicted in Figure 2.
The client desires to verify a route. The target host or IP address represents the
endpoint of the route. The geo-location server stores location and compliance
information about IP addresses. The compliance checks for routes are performed
in four steps.
1. The client runs traceroute to the target host.
2. The client collects responses from hops along the path.
3. The client submits hops to the geo-location server.
4. The geo-location server analyzes these hops and sends country and compli-
ance information back to the client, which prints the result.
A sample run of chkroute is shown in Figure 3. The chkroute command is
executed from a client at University of Zurich towards a server of the University
of Federal Armed Forces in Munich. Both hosts are located in Schengen. The
output produces a hop count, an IP address, the country code, Schengen routing
compliance information (Yes (“Y”), No (“N”), and Unknown (“Unknown”)), and
the AS number.
Target Host
Client
Geo‐location 
Database
1 3
4
2
Fig. 2. The chkroute architecture
The sample output shows that this network traffic remains inside the Schen-
gen Area until hop 7, leaves the Schengen Area for hops 8 to 11, and it returns
at hop 12. Hop 13 is unknown. To ease the readability of this result, all hops
are color-coded: green is for compliant, red for non-compliant, and yellow for
unknown.
6 Summary, Conclusion, and Future Work
This paper presented key results of a larger-scale measurement conducted to
determine the extent to which current routing is Schengen-compliant in Schengen
countries. Based on 3388 TCP, UDP, and ICMP traceroute measurements run
from RIPE Atlas probes located in over 1100 ASes in the Schengen Area it was
found that compliance levels vary substantially among countries and range from
0% (TCP), 0% (UDP) and 0% (ICMP) in the case of Malta to 80% (TCP), 75%
(UDP), and 80% (ICMP) in the case of Liechtenstein. The overall compliance
levels range from 34.5% (TCP) to 37.4% (UDP) and 39.7% (ICMP).
Based on these measurements performed, this paper concludes that Schengen
Routing compliance is not achieved in any of the Schengen countries, contradict-
ing the claim that Schengen routing already was a factual reality today, as it has
been stated by the Association of the German Internet Industry [4]. Therefore,
intelligence agencies still can perform potential wiretapping activities outside the
Schengen jurisdiction on traffic originating within and destined to the Schengen
Area.
This work and chkroute especially with the data set collected only analyze
traffic in the forward direction. The reverse path may not necessarily be the
same [11]. Hence, future work will address the reverse path, too. Furthermore,
as only routes originating in Schengen countries targeted at a single node in
Switzerland have been analyzed, results may differ, if a target node in another
Fig. 3. chkroute output
country was chosen. In particular, routes originating in a Schengen country A
may be more or less likely than those originating in another Schengen country B
to traverse a non-Schengen country depending on the location of the target node.
Finally, an additional extension to this work is to analyze traffic for individual
countries in more detail as well as to provide details with respect to countries
that cause routes to be non-compliant with Schengen routing. It is also essential
to identify those Schengen countries that are exit and entry points for traffic out
of the Schengen Area and to examine the reason why this is the case.
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